We investigate the e¤ect of remittances on bank credit in developing countries. Understanding this link is important in view of the growing relevance of remittances as a source of external …nance and of the bene…cial impact that …nancial intermediation is likely to have on economic growth. Our approach is essentially inductive and our contribution is twofold. First, we look at the evidence using a panel dataset for a large group of developing and emerging economies over the period . We …nd that at initially low levels of remittances, an increase in remittances reduces the volume of credit extended by banks. However, at su¢ ciently high levels of remittances, the e¤ect becomes positive.
Introduction
In capital scarce economies individuals are often trapped in poverty not because they lack pro…table investment opportunities, but because they lack the initial …nance needed to undertake such investments. It is therefore not surprising that the expansion of credit markets and banking services are now regularly placed at the core of development and poverty reduction strategies. 1 Meanwhile, in recent years, remittances from abroad have come to be recognized as an important source of external …nance for households in many developing countries. It is then important to understand how the in ‡ow of remittances a¤ects the volume of credit provided domestically. On the one hand, remittances might substitute for domestic credit as individuals who receive remittances would not need to borrow from the domestic banks (or other …nancial institutions) in order to invest. On the other hand, remittances might crowd-in domestic credit by increasing the volume of resources that banks can potentially mobilize and therefore lend. Moreover, individuals who receive remittances might become more …nancially literate and hence express a stronger demand for banking services and …nancial intermediation. In this paper we show that the balance between these two opposing e¤ects depends on the volume of remittances received by a country. More speci…cally, when a country receives only a small amount of remittances, their e¤ect on credit is negative. However, when the ‡ow of remittances grows beyond a certain threshold, the e¤ect becomes positive.
Our analysis is related to a burgeoning body of research that studies the relationship between remittances and broad …nancial development. Findings from this literature indicate that while remittances are often used to overcome credit constraints in …nancially underdevelopped economies (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; Ramirez and Sharma, 2009; Arezki and Bruckner, 2011; Combes et al. 2011; Anzoategui et al. 2014) , their aggregate e¤ect on …nancial deepening is on balance positive (Hunte, 2004; Martinez et al. 2008; Billmeier and Massa, 2009; Gupta et al. 2009; Aggarwal et al. 2011; Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2011) .
However, there is also some (limited) micro-level evidence suggesting that the likelihood of a household having a bank account does not depend on the volume of remittances received (Mogilevsky and Atamanov, 2009 and Brown et al. 2013) . This would in turn indicate that remittances do not necessarily increase household's demand for banking services. The existing work is almost exclusively empirical and focuses on the estimation of linear relationships. In our paper, instead, we combine empirics and theory to show that the relationship between remittances and credit provided by banks is likely to be non-linear. Our approach is essentially inductive. In the …rst part of our paper, we look at the data. A simple scatter plot with a non-parametric …t suggests that the relationship is possibly U-shaped, suggesting that the positive e¤ect of remittances on credit occurs only at su¢ ciently high levels of remittances. Accordingly, we estimate a regression model of credit using a quadratic speci…cation, with linear and squared remittances as explanatory variables. This estimation excercise is conducted using a panel data set for a large group of countries over the period . In the baseline regression, we control for several other determinants of credit and we deal with unobserved country heterogeneity using standard random and …xed e¤ects estimators. We also present dynamic speci…cations that include a lagged dependent variable in addition to the other controls. These dynamic speci…cations are estimated using the di¤erence-GMM estimator. Two key …ndings emerge. First, when remittances are entered linearly in the credit equation, their estimated coe¢ cient is positive, but not statistically di¤erent from zero. Second, in a quadratic speci…cation, the coe¢ cient of the linear term on remittances is negative, the coe¢ cient of the quadratic term is positive, and both coe¢ -cients are strongly signi…cant at usual con…dence levels. This is evidence that the e¤ect of remittances on credit is U-shaped rather than linear.
3
How can the observed non-linear e¤ect of remittances be rationalized? To answer this question, in the second part of our paper, we present a theoretical model of banking and remittances in a hypothetical developing economy where the credit market is imperfectly competitive. We prove that the existence of positive adjustment costs (a likely occurrence in many economies) is su¢ cient to generate the type of non-linearities observed in the data.
The intuition is as follows. A representative bank sets deposit and lending rates to maximize its pro…t. Starting from an initial position where the rates are set at the pro…t maximizing level, an increase in remittances reduces the demand for loans. This has two consequences:
(i) the volume of credit provided by the bank declines (as less credit is demanded); and,
(ii) the bank is no longer maximizing pro…ts. To return to a pro…t-maximizing equilibrium, the bank should reset its rates. However, positive adjustment costs imply that the bank will do that only if the loss of pro…ts from not adjusting is su¢ ciently large to make the adjustment of rates worthwhile. This loss of pro…ts in turn is proportional to the in ‡ow of remittances. So, for low levels of remittances, the loss is small, the bank does not adjust the rates, and credit declines. But for su¢ ciently high levels of remittances, the avoided loss is large enough to o¤set the adjustment cost and hence the bank resets its rates to stimulate greater demand for loans. As a consequence, more credit is provided in the new equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the data analysis.
Section 3 presents the theoretical argument. Section 4 concludes. Data description and sources are given in the Appendix. In order to gain some more insights from this scatter plot, we trace out a non-parametric …t line using the lowess approach (see Clevand, 1993 and 1994) . The key feature of this method is that it does not require us to choose a parametric form for the relationship. 4 The non-parametric …t line is represented in Figure 2 , together with the relevant 95% con…dence
Evidence
interval. It appears that the relationship is indeed U shaped rather than linearly positive. In the rest of this section, we present some more formal evidence concerning this non-linearity.
Model and estimation approach
We estimate the following econometric model:
4 More speci…cally, consider two variables y and x, i.e. remittances (y) and bank credit (x ). Data are structured as a panel of m cross sections and t years. We stack cross-section so to obtain for each variable a string of N = m t datapoints. For each data point x n , with n = 1, 2....N, we …t a "local" regression y i = + 1 x i + 2 x 2 i + ::: k x k i + " i using only a subset of observations (y i ; x i ) that lie around x n and giving smaller weights to observations that are more distant from x n . The smoothed curve representing the relationship between y and x is then traced out from the …tted values of the N local regressions evaluated at x n . A relevant property of the smoothed curve is that its shape at high values of x is not a¤ected by data points corresponding to low values of x. In implementing the procedure, we use a bandwidth span of 80%; that is, each local regression includes only 80% of all sample observations. In this way, we increase the smoothness of the line. We also set the degree of polynomial of the local regression equal to one. The weighting system is such that observations that are relatively far from the point being evaluated get small weights in the sum of squared residuals of the regression.
where i denotes a generic country and t a generic year, y is a measure of domestic credit provided by the banking sector, x is the ‡ow of remittances, m is a vector of basic controls, w is a vector of additional controls, " is a disturbance term, f ( ) is a generic function, and and are the coe¢ cients to be estimated along with the vectors and : The disturbance term is de…ned as the sum of two orthogonal components: " it = i + it , where is a country speci…c e¤ect (random or …xed) and is an idiosyncratic shock.
The model is estimated for two "competing" functional forms of f ( ):
The functional form (2) restricts the relationship to be linear, as assumed in most of the empirical work. The functional form (3) instead allows for a U-shaped relationship, as suggested from Figure 2 .
We proceed to the estimation of equation (1) in two ways. First, we impose the restriction = 0 and apply standard random and …xed e¤ect estimators for panel data. Second, we relax the restriction on the autoregressive coe¢ cient and estimate the resulting dynamic model using the di¤erence-GMM procedure originally proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . As is well known, this procedure involves taking …rst di¤erences of equation (1) to remove the country e¤ect component of the disturbance (which, in a dynamic setting, is necessarily correlated with the other regressors, thus biasing estimates). The …rst-di¤erenced equation is then estimated using a set of internal instruments, built from past observations of the potentially endogenous regressors.
The di¤erence-GMM procedure provides a convenient solution to the key consistency issues that emerge in the estimation of dynamic panels. However, it is not immune from complications. First of all, the procedure hinges on the ident…ying assumption that the lagged values of the dependent variable and the other endogenous regressors are valid instruments. For this to be the case, the necessary condition is that there must be no …rst order serial correlation in the errors, which is equivalent to assuming that there is no second order serial correlation in the …rst di¤erenced errors (that is, the errors in the …rst di¤er-enced equation). To verify this condition, we perform the Arellano and Bond (1991) A second major complication with the di¤erence-GMM procedure is the risk of instrument proliferation. This can occur in panels with a long time series dimension because the procedure generates a total number of instruments that is quadratic in the number of timeseries observations. Therefore the total instrument count can easily grow large relative to the sample size. When this happens, instruments over…t instrumented variables and fail to remove their endogenous components, thus making the entire estimation procedure invalid.
This problem of instrument proliferation is likely to be particularly acute in our case given that our panel spans over a relatively long period of time. In fact, when implementing the procedure without imposing restrictions on the number of instruments, we obtain a p-value for the test statistic of the Hansen test that is equal to 1.000. This is a clear symptom of instrument proliferation. We therefore follow Roodman (2009) and take two corrective steps. First, we use only certain lags instead of all available lags for instruments. Second, we collapse the instruments through addition into smaller sets. In this way we signi…cantly reduce the instrument count and obtain more reasonable statistics for the Hansen test.
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Finally, as a possible improvement on the di¤erence-GMM procedure, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) propose a system-GMM procedure where both the original levels equation and the …rst-di¤erenced equation are jointly estimated as a system. By exploiting additional moment conditions, the system-GMM might be more e¢ cient. However, the gain in e¢ ciency is obtained only to the extent that the GMM-style instruments for the levels equation are valid. To check this, we initially ran the system-GMM procedure and conducted a di¤erence-in-Hansen test. The test indicated that the instruments for the levels equation were not valid. We therefore prefer to report the results from the di¤erence-GMM procedure, in addition to the random and …xed e¤ects regressions. 
Results
The estimates of (linear speci…cation) and 1 and 2 (quadratic speci…cation) are presented in Table 1 together with a set of statistics, including the total number of observations used for estimation, the number of countries included, and the average number of observations per country. For the di¤erence-GMM estimator (columns VI to X), the table also reports the two previously mentioned diagnostics test: the test of …rst and second order autocorrelation in …rst-di¤erenced errors and the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. As can be seen, there is evidence of …rst order autocorrelation, but this is expected because the …rst-di¤erenced errors are by construction serially correlated. However, the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation can never be rejected, meaning that the errors in levels are 5 There is no speci…c theory indicating what is a safe number of instruments. The results presented in the next subsection are obtained by capping the number of lags to 16 for each period and the collapsing these instruments into subsets. This makes the total instrument count smaller than the number of countries in the panel, in line with a rule of thumb that is sometimes applied in the literature. However, we experimented with di¤erent caps, further reducing as well as increasing the total instrument count, but always making sure that the p-value of the Hansen statistic does not reach 1.000 (or very close to 1). Results did not di¤er qualitatively from those discussed below. All results are available from the authors upon request. 6 Results of the di¤erence-in-Hansen test and from the system-GMM procedure are available upon requests.
e¤ectively not correlated. Similarly, the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid is never rejected. Taken together, these diagnostic tests support the identifying assumptions on which the di¤erence-GMM procedure hinges.
Both domestic credit provided by the banking sector and remittances are expressed in percentage of GDP. The vector of basic control variables (m) includes the log of per-capita income, the exports to GDP ratio, the annual rate of in ‡ation, and the in ‡ow of o¢ cial development assistance in per cent of GDP. In ‡ation is found to reduce credit, most likely because it reduces individual's incentive to save in …nancial assets (as opposed to real assets) and hence discourages …nancial intermediation.
A bigger share of the manufacturing sector has a generally positive e¤ect, albeit not always 7 See Appendix for variables'description, sources, and summary statistics. Note that we use World Bank data for remittances. However, as discussed below, we test the sensitivity of our results using an alternative dataset for remittances that Paola Giuliano kindly made available to us. Results are qualitatively very similar in the two cases. 8 The literature has also emphasized the contribution of time invariant factors, such as legal origins and colonial heritage, to …nancial development (Beck and Levine, 2003; Harper and McNulty, 2008) . These factors are captured by the country speci…c e¤ect in equation (1) and therefore do not need to be measured by a speci…c empirical proxy. 9 We argue that theoretically the e¤ect of exports on …nancial development is ambiguous and depends on the structure of exports. Manufacturing exports are likely to have a positive e¤ect, while primary commodity exports may have a negative e¤ect. In our sample, this negative e¤ect prevails.
signi…cant. Our interpretration is that the manufacturing sector, more than agriculture and services, is likely to express a strong demand for credit. Therefore, the bigger this sector is, the more scope for credit market development there is. Finally, neither FDI nor foreign aid is statistically signi…cant.
INSERT (2), remittances have a positive, but largely non-signi…cant coe¢ cient. Instead, with the non-linear speci…cation (equation 3), the linear term is negative, the quadratic term is positive, and both coe¢ cients are signi…cant. This suggests that at initially lower levels of remittances, a further increase in remittances reduces the volume of credit. However, past a certain threshold level of remittances, the e¤ect becomes positive. The point estimates indicate that this threshold level of remittances is around 2.5% of GDP. For approximately 51% of our sample, remittances in 2010 were greater than 2.5% of GDP.
In the remaining columns of Table 1 , a dynamic version of the model is estimated. The results in column V are still obtained using the standard …xed e¤ect estimator, which is however biased in the presence of a lagged dependent variable, as previously discussed. The other columns instead present di¤erence-GMM estimates. The linear speci…cation in column VI and the quadratic speci…cation in column VII again only include the basic set of controls.
The central …nding does not change qualitatively from the estimates of the static model: the relationship between credit and remittances is U-shaped. This same result holds when we use total domestic credit to the private sector (in % of GDP) as the dependent variable (column VIII) and when we include additional controls in the speci…cation (column IX -dependent variable is credit provided by banks -and column X -dependent variable is domestic credit to the private sector).
As a sensitivity check, we re-estimated all the models in Table 1 Table 1 . In particular, the coe¢ cient of remittances is always insigni…cant in the linear speci…cation. The quadratic speci…cation instead returns a negative coe¢ cient on remittances and a positive coe¢ cient on remittances squared. Quantitatively, the level of the remittances-to-GDP ratio which minimizes …nancial development is still located at around 2.5%. 
Theoretical formalization
The evidence reported in the previous section indicates that the e¤ect of remittances on domestic …nancial development is U-shaped. How can this non-linearity be rationalized ?
To answer this question, we present a stylised model of the credit market of a developing or emerging economy that receives remittances. The focus is not on the channels through which remittances are transferred from abroad, but rather on the impact that the in ‡ow of remittances has on the domestic supply and demand of credit.
Our formalization of the credit market hinges on two assumptions. First, the market is imperfectly competitive. More speci…cally, in line with the existing evidence on the structure of the banking sector in developing and emerging economies, we consider a representative bank that has some monopoly power (see Mamatzakis et al. 2005; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Mandelman, 2010; Maudos and Solis, 2011) . This means that the bank can set its lending and deposit rates to maximize its pro…t.
Second, bank rates change infrequently. The theoretical foundation of this assumption follows the tradition of adjustment costs theories of price dynamics. For instance, Hannan and Berger (1991) use the menu cost model of Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) to explain price stikciness in the banking sector, while Klemperer (1987) suggests that his model of switching costs could also be used for the same purpose. Hannan and Liang (1993) model sticky bank rates as a consequence of lack of competition. Fried and Howitt (1980) applies the Azariadis (1976) model of implicit insurance contracts in labour markets to explain how infrequent adjustments are the way in which banks assure risk averse lenders of a relatively constant interest rate. In a broader perspective, a number of theoretical models of bank rates stickiness take into account the special nature of a loan contract (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and Ausbel, 1991) .
There is also strong empirical support to the stickiness assumption, particularly in markets characterized by higher levels of concentration (see, inter alia, Berger, 1991, Neumark and Sharpe, 1992; Mester and Sounders, 1995 Scholnik, 1996; Craig and Dinger, 2010) . Some recent evidence on the slow and incomplete adjustment of retail bank interest rates to changes in monetary policy (Hofmann and Mizen, 2004 , de Graeve et al. 2007 , Sander and Kleimeier, 2006 ) is also relevant to support our assumption.
Set-up
There are two groups of households, respectively labelled as R and P . The representative household in each group has access to an investment project characterized by a return r i .
The distribution of investment returns across households in each group is uniform, with supports (0; 1). There are N (1 ) households in group R and N (1 + ) households in group P . Each household in group R is endowed with one unit of wealth (e.g. investible funds) which can be either used to …nance the investment project or stored in a bank at a deposit rate r d . Households in group P have no initial wealth, but they can borrow one unit of wealth from the bank at a lending rate r b . They can then use this wealth to …nance their investment project.
The representative household in group R will invest its unit of wealth in the project if r i > r d , otherwise it will deposit this wealth in the bank. This implies that the "supply" of funds in the …nancial market is S = r d N (1 ). Similarly, the representative household in group P will borrow and invest as long as r i > r b : Therefore, the "demand" for loans is given by D = (1 r b )N (1 + ). The bank optimally chooses r d and r b , and therefore the interest rate di¤erential, in order to maximize its pro…t given the demand and supply schedules.
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The market equilibrium and the maximization problem of the bank are represented in 
The …rst order condition for the maximization of (4) : The pro…t of the banks in this case would obviously be zero.
The e¤ect of remittances
We model remittances as a change in the relative size of the two groups. The underlying intuition is that, at some point in time, one member of some of the households in group P will migrate abroad and start sending remittances back home. More speci…cally, we assume that N households in group P receive exactly one unit of wealth in remittances while none of the households already in group R receives any remittances. These assumptions are not essential to our argument, but they do make the model analytically more tractable (see also the discussion below).
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As a result of the in ‡ow of remittances, there are now N households in each group.
The conditions for investment and deposit remain the same as before and hence the new supply and demand schedules are, respectively, S 0 = r d N and D 0 = (1 r b )N . This shift in the supply and demand schedules clearly requires the bank to adjust its rates in order to 12 In fact, our assumption that only individuals from group P migrate …nds some signi…cant support in the literature. For instance, Massey et al. (1994) and McKenzie (2006) demonstrate that poorer, less educated individuals have a much stronger incentive to migrate abroad than the wealthier and better educated ones. maximize pro…t. Formally, the new pro…t function to be maximized by the bank is written as:
The …rst order condition yields y 0 = N=4 and the associated interest rates are r . The associated pro…t of the bank is 0 = N 8
. The optimal response of the bank to the in ‡ow of remittances therefore involves a reduction in both the deposit and the lending rate and an increase in the volume of credit provided to the households. By undertaking such a response, the bank also increases its pro…t.
Suppose however that to change the rates, the bank has to pay some adjustment cost z.
The bank will then compare the adjustment cost z against the loss of pro…ts arising from not adjusting the rates. This loss is simply the di¤erence between 0 and the pro…t ( 0 ) that the bank makes if the interest rates are kept at their original level (that is, the level they were before remittances started ‡owing in). Formally:
where
is the demand of funds at the original lending rate given the new demand schedule determined by the in ‡ow of remittances and, similarly, (1 + ): Then from (6) 0 = N 8
(1 2 2 ) and the loss is`=
, the bank does not change its interest rates and the volume of credit provided by the bank declines from
Note however that the supply of funds is now greater than the demand for loans. This means that if the bank does not adjust the interest rate, then it will collect excess funds on which it will have to pay interest, but which will not produce any pro…t as they cannot be lent. In this case, the bank might impose a cap on deposits (in practice, one can think that the bank does not pay any interest on deposits in excess of loans demanded). The cap
(1 ) and 0 = N 8
(1 ). The corresponding loss of pro…ts,
, is smaller than the loss su¤ered when deposits are not capped. Therefore, with a cap on deposits, a lower adjustment cost is needed for the bank to decide not to adjust its rates. Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium when z is high enough to prevent the bank from adjusting its deposit and lending rates. If the bank does not place a cap on deposits, then the pro…t 0 is equal to the di¤erence between area A and area B. If instead the bank caps deposits, then 0 is equal to area A. The rectangle marked in thicker lines is instead the pro…t that the bank makes when it adjusts its rates.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Whether the bank caps deposits or not, the loss from not adjusting is always increasing in the in ‡ow of remittances N . Hence, the bank becomes more likely to adjust as the in ‡ow of remittances grows. This is likely to result in the relationship between credit provided by the bank and remittances to be non-linear. Before remittances are received, credit is
At low levels of remittances, the loss of pro…ts is small, the bank is less likely to adjust, and hence credit is reduced to
. At high levels of remittances, the loss is large, the bank is more likely to adjust, and hence credit increases to N=4. Empirically, we would therefore expect a U-shaped relationship between volume of remittances and volume of credit granted by banks.
Generalization and propositions
The previous results can be generalized to the case where migration and the associated in ‡ow of remittances do not necessarily result in two equally sized groups of households. That is, we now assume that N (where 6 = ) households in group P receive remittances and hence move to group R. The initial equilibrium is the one depicted in Figure 3 . Two propositions then follow:
Proposition 1 If the bank faces su¢ ciently high costs of adjustment, then the e¤ect of remittances on credit is non-linear (U-shaped) unless the bank can place a cap on the volume of deposits received and the migration ‡ow is so strong that the majority of households can invest without having to borrow from the bank, in which case the relationship is linear and negative.
Proof. if deposits are not capped. For < , both losses are increasing in and hence the relationship between credit and remittances is likely to be U-shaped. For > ; that is, when the migration and remittance in ‡ows are so strong that the majority of households end-up being in group R, then the loss of pro…ts is increasing in only in the case where deposits are not capped. If instead deposits are capped and z is su¢ ciently high to prevent the bank from adjusting when is low, then further increases in will not result in any subsequent adjustment. The implication in this case is that the relationship between remittances and credit is linear and negative.
Proposition 2 If adjustment costs are low and do not deter the bank from adjusting the interest rates, then the e¤ect of remittances on credit is linear and either positive or negative depending on the initial size of the two groups. If group P is initially larger, then the in ‡ow of remittances increases credit. If instead R is initially larger (or if the two groups are initially of the same size), then the in ‡ow of remittances reduces credit.
Proof. In the equilibrium without remittances, the volume of credit is always equal to
. If interest rates are immediately adjusted, then the volume of credit grows
when group P is initially larger. But if group R is initially larger, that , which is smaller than y = N (1 2 ) 4 for any > 0.
Propositions 1 and 2 summarize our argument: the type of non-linearities observed in the data can be generated by adding su¢ ciently high adjustment costs to a model of bank credit with imperfect competition. We believe that this explanation is potentially relevant because both imperfect competition and sizeable adjustment costs are likely features of credit markets in developing and emerging economies.
Further extensions
To complete the presentation of the theory, we provide a brief intuitive discussion of two possible extensions of the basic framework.
The …rst extension concerns the assumption that only households in group P have a family member who migrates and sends remittances back home. Allowing households in group R to receive remittances is however unlikely to produce major substantive changes to the results. If some proportion of households in R have a migrant member, then these households will receive an extra unit of wealth which, again they can invest (assuming that they have more than one valuable investment opportunity) or deposit in the bank. The second extension relates to the assumption that the distribution of investment projects over households in the two groups is uniform. Clearly, one can assume di¤erent distributions, which would in turn generate supply and demand schedules that cannot be represented as straight lines. However, as long as such supply and demand schedules are monotone with resepct to the interest rate, then the basic mechanics of the model will hold and the predictions summarized in the two propositions above will still be qualitatively valid.
The main complication would be that the pro…t of the bank can no longer be determined as the area of a rectangle inscribed in a triangle (as in Figures 3 and 4) and, therefore, the closed form solutions of the model would be mathematically more tedious.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to to further our understanding of the impact remittance in ‡ows on the development of the credit market in the recipient country. On the one hand, remittances might reduce the need for individuals to borrow from the banks to …nance their investment projects. This substitution e¤ect would cause remittances to reduce credit. On the other hand, once received, remittances can be channelled into the formal …nancial system, thereby increasing banks' capacity to mobilize and lend funds. The net e¤ect is therefore uncertain. We examine these empirically and the o¤er a theoretical explanation for our …ndings.
We …rst present some empirical evidence that the e¤ect of remittances on …nancial development is likely non-linear. A non-parametric scatter plot indicates that the relationship is actually U-Shaped. We substantiate this …nding by estimating a more formal econometric model using panel data for a large sample of countries. We …t both linear and quadratic speci…cations, allowing for a dynamic dependent variable and a broad set of controls. We use the volume of credit provided by the banking sector and the volume of total domestic credit to the private sector as our dependent variables. The empirical results strongly support the non-linear speci…cation. In a linear speci…cation, the coe¢ cient of remittances is positive, but statistically never signi…cant. In a quadratic speci…cation, the linear term is negative, the square term is positive, and both are statistically signi…cant. This means that as remittances increase, credit …rst decreases and then increases. Estimates indicate that the turning point occurs at a level of remittances of about 2.5% of GDP, which would imply that approximately 50% of our sample lie on each side of the turning point.
To explain the source of the non-linearity, we present a simple theoretical model of an imperfectly competitive credit market with adjustment costs. A representative bank chooses the lending and deposit rates to maximize its pro…t, as it is indeed in the case in many developing countries. The in ‡ow of remittances modi…es the credit supply and demand schedule, thus requiring the bank to adjust the rates in order to achieve pro…t maximization. However, as suggested by a large body of theoretical and empirical work on the stickiness of bank rates in developing countries, adjustment is costly. Therefore, the bank e¤ectively adjusts its rates only if the avoided loss of pro…ts from adjusting is larger than the adjustment cost. This type of friction generates the possibility of a non-linearity in the relationship between remittances and credit. Intuitively, remittances tend to reduce the equilibrium level of credit if the bank does not adjust its rates in responses to changed supply and demand conditions. At the same time, the loss of pro…ts from not adjusting increases as the in ‡ow of remittances increases. This is because the larger the volume of remittances, the bigger the di¤erence between the pro…t-maximizing level of the interest rates and the current level of the interest rates. So, at initially low levels of remittances, the bank does not adjust the rates and credit decreases. But as more remittances are received, the loss of pro…ts increases, eventually inducing the bank to adjust its rates. This in turn leads to an increase in the equilibrium level of credit.
Remittances are a very important source of external …nance in many developing and emerging countries. The expansion of credit and …nancial deepening are recognised as key drivers of economic growth and development. We therefore expect the literature on the relationship between remittances and credit to expand considerably in the future. We suggest two possible items for the research agenda in this area. First, it would be interesting to combine the macro with the micro perspective, especially in regard to the econometric analysis. For instance, household level data on the banking behaviour of remittance recipients and non-recipients would allow for more direct examination of the relationship between remittances and demand for banking services.
Second, it would be important to see whether the e¤ect of remittances on credit is conditional on factors such as the channels through which remittances are transferred from abroad, the country from which the remittances originate, and the economic conditions and/or institutional features of the recipient country. For instance, if migrants and the recipient households have reasons for wishing to avoid the costs of formal …nancial sector transfers and/or the o¢ cial recording of the these transfers, it is conceivable that the demand for …nancial services will be negatively a¤ected by the in ‡ow of remittances.
Appendix
Variables de…nition, sources, and summary statistics Mean and standard deviation are computed from the sample used for the estimation of the equations in colums IX and X. For remittances we also used the data available from Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) Notes: vector m includes: log per-capita GDP, exports (% of GDP), aid (% of GDP), and in ‡ation. Vector w includes aggregate GDP, FDI (% of GDP), and manufacturing share of total value added. Estimators are: GLS random e¤ects (RE), …xed e¤ects (FE), and di¤erence-GMM (with robust std. errors) (di¤-GMM). Dependent variables are: credit provided by banks (% of GDP) in columns I to VII and in column IX; domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) in columns VIII and X. *, **, *** denotes statistical signi…cance at 10%, 5%, and 1% con…dence levels respectively.
